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 3 
Objective: To examine the effect of parallel trade on patterns of price dispersion for 4 
prescription drugs in the European Union. 5 
Data Sources: Longitudinal data from an IMS Midas database of prices and units sold 6 
for drugs in 36 categories in 30 countries from 1993 through 2004. 7 
Study Design: The main outcome measures were mean price differentials and other 8 
measures of price dispersion within European Union countries compared to within non–9 
European Union countries. 10 
Data Collection/Extraction Methods: We identified drugs subject to parallel trade using 11 
information provided by IMS and by checking membership lists of parallel import trade 12 
associations and lists of approved parallel imports. 13 
Principal Findings: Parallel trade was not associated with substantial reductions in price 14 
dispersion in European Union countries. In descriptive and regression analyses, about half of the 15 
price differentials exceeded 50 percent in both European Union and non–European Union 16 
countries over time, and price distributions among European Union countries did not show a 17 
dramatic change concurrent with the adoption of parallel trade. In regression analysis, we found 18 
that although price differentials decreased after 1995 in most countries, they decreased less in the 19 
European Union than elsewhere. 20 
Conclusions: Parallel trade for prescription drugs does not automatically reduce 21 
international price differences. Future research should explore how other regulatory schemes 22 
might lead to different results elsewhere. 23 
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Introduction 25 
Cross-national differences in prescription drug prices have been a topic of much 26 
discussion in the media and in policy circles (Bright 2006; Baker 2004). Researchers have 27 
described some of the underlying causes of these price differences, including international 28 
exchange rates and differences in patient demand and national income. Government regulations, 29 
such as price controls and reimbursement policies, can also contribute to price differences by 30 
fixing prices or reducing the price sensitivity of patients or their agents (Stuart et al 2000; 31 
Danzon and Chao 2000; Danzon and Furukawa 2003). 32 
One way to reduce price differences would be to remove restrictions on the flow of 33 
prescription drugs across markets (i.e., to permit arbitrage). “Parallel trade,” or “reimportation,” 34 
has been proposed to allow people in countries with higher drug prices to acquire prescription 35 
drugs from countries with lower prices. In the United States, President Bill Clinton signed 36 
legislation in October 2000 to permit parallel trade under strict safety rules (Medicine Equity and 37 
Drug Safety Act 2000). Regulations to implement the legislation have not been developed, 38 
however, due to concerns about safety and logistics (Rubin 2000). Thus, parallel trade remains 39 
illegal in the United States. However, the question of whether parallel trade would reduce 40 
prescription drug prices in the United States and other countries without parallel trade remains 41 
open. 42 
With parallel trade being illegal in the United States, we set out to examine data from the 43 
European Union, where parallel trade is permitted. Parallel trade is part of a comprehensive 44 
effort to move toward a single market for all goods, including prescription drugs, in the 45 
European Union (Farquason and Smith 1998). Nonetheless, safety concerns still exist and there 46 
are strict rules governing such trade. A parallel importer must obtain licenses to import products 47 
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of identical chemical composition for each dosage form, dosage strength, and market of origin. 48 
The cost of the license is approximately !1500 in most countries, or !3480 for products approved 49 
through the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. If the product has 50 
packaging in a different language, a different brand name, or a different pack size, the parallel 51 
trader may also incur repackaging costs (Arfwedson 2004). 52 
In economics, the law of one price states that identical tradable goods should have the 53 
same price in all locations (or the difference cannot exceed transportation costs). If not, it would 54 
be profitable for someone to arbitrage the price difference indefinitely and make infinite earnings 55 
(Mankiw 2007). Indeed, parallel traders act as arbitrageurs by purchasing products in low-price 56 
markets and reselling them in high-price markets. This trade can affect price dispersion in two 57 
ways. First, migration of products from low-price to high-price markets can reduce the average 58 
price paid for a particular product in high-price markets, especially if parallel traders sell their 59 
imports at lower prices than the original products in the high-price market, thus narrowing the 60 
price difference between markets. Second, manufacturers may reduce the prices of their products 61 
in high-price markets to match lower prices offered by parallel importers or in response to the 62 
threat of parallel trade. Thus, even if parallel trade does not actually occur, its possibility may 63 
constrain prices. In theory, firms could also raise prices in low-price markets to make parallel 64 
trade less appealing. In practice, however, price controls in the European Union allow little 65 
flexibility in this regard. Indeed, many countries impose mandatory price reductions over time. 66 
The specifics of price control policies have been described in detail elsewhere (Jacobzone 2000). 67 
The effect of such policies is that any price change in a country with price controls tends to be a 68 
reduction rather than an increase. 69 
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The impact of parallel trade also depends on the incentives of key agents in each country 70 
to substitute parallel imports for (presumably more expensive) original products, much like the 71 
development of a market for generic versions of off-patent drugs. Some institutional features of 72 
particular countries may dampen such incentives, such as additional regulations on the profits of 73 
pharmacists, and patient copayments that are generally the same whether a drug is a parallel 74 
import or an original product. However, Kanavos et al. (2003) have noted that “traditionally 75 
high-price countries seem to have mature policies in place enabling their health insurance 76 
systems to benefit somewhat from parallel importation of pharmaceuticals.” 77 
The legalization of parallel trade and the elimination of exchange-rate fluctuations 78 
resulting from the adoption of the euro in most European Union countries should have reduced 79 
the dispersion of prescription drug prices in the European Union. We would expect to see a 80 
greater reduction in price dispersion over time in the European Union than in places where 81 
parallel trade is not allowed. For example, Goldberg and Verboven (2005) found such a 82 
reduction in automobile price dispersion in the European Union during a similar time period. In 83 
other sectors of the economy, such as gas, electricity, and telecommunications, price dispersion 84 
in the European Union fell from 1985 through 1999, and the standard deviation of the price 85 
index for tradable goods fell from 0.11 in 1990 to 0.05 in 1999 (European Commission 2001). 86 
However, little evidence on the effect of parallel trade exists. When the British House of 87 
Commons considered the question of international exhaustion of trademarks in 1999, its 88 
Committee on Trade and Industry noted, “[whilst] we appreciate that it is difficult to determine 89 
empirically the precise size and character of the flow of parallel imports, we share the Minister’s 90 
concern that very little empirical research has been undertaken into the potential effects of 91 
international exhaustion” (House of Commons 1999). Evidence regarding the impact of parallel 92 
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trade on price dispersion for prescription drugs is limited. Previous studies examined the effect 93 
on prices for top-selling drugs in select markets, but not how prices have changed across the 94 
European Union relative to changes in other countries (Enemark, Pederson, and Sorensen 2006; 95 
Kanavos et al. 2004; Ganslandt and Maskus 2004). Therefore, we analyzed price dispersion of a 96 
larger set of prescription drugs in the European Union over a 12-year period to address these 97 
questions. 98 
99 
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Methods 99 
We obtained data for all prescription drugs in 36 therapeutic categories (see Appendix) in 100 
30 countries from the first quarter of 1993 through the third quarter of 2004. The data constitute 101 
a subset of the IMS Midas database (IMS Health; Fairfield, Conn.), the most comprehensive 102 
source of information on international drug prices and sales. Therapeutic classes were selected in 103 
an effort to provide a mix of small molecules and biologics that have high use in most markets, 104 
as well as some with high costs (e.g., oncology products). A total of 1,023 chemicals (or unique 105 
chemical combinations) are included in these classes, and about 20 percent were still on patent at 106 
the end of the study period. 107 
The data set contains information at the package level (e.g., chemicals, dosage form, 108 
strength, and pack size) on the quantity sold in each country through both retail and hospital 109 
channels, and through other important channels in the United States, such as sales to health 110 
maintenance organizations, clinics, and physician offices. The data set includes the ex-111 
manufacturer price (i.e., the price paid by wholesalers to manufacturers), the wholesale price (i.e., 112 
the price paid by retailers to wholesalers), and the retail price per standard unit (i.e., the price 113 
paid by consumers or third-party payers) measured in US dollars at the current exchange rate in 114 
each quarter. We used the ex-manufacturer price for two reasons. First, the retail distribution of 115 
pharmaceuticals varies substantially across countries and may lead to different price markups for 116 
reasons unrelated to parallel trade. Second, neither pharmacists nor patients in many countries, 117 
particularly European Union countries, may have much incentive to find the lowest price for 118 
drugs, because profits are regulated or they face copayments that are the same whether the drug 119 
is a parallel import or an original product. Wholesalers likely have the most to gain from the use 120 
of parallel imports, and previous studies have established that parallel trade usually occurs at the 121 
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wholesale level rather than the retail level (NERA 1999; Maskus and Chen 2002). However, we 122 
replicated the analyses using wholesale and retail prices and obtained similar results, so we 123 
report only the analysis of ex-manufacturer prices. 124 
We identified drugs that were subject to parallel trade in two ways. IMS identifies some 125 
products as parallel imports in the MIDAS database, but only for Germany and the United 126 
Kingdom. We assumed that products sold elsewhere in the European Union by the same firms 127 
that were identified as selling parallel imports in the MIDAS database were also parallel imports. 128 
We verified that these firms were parallel traders by checking their names against the 129 
membership lists of parallel import trade associations in the European Union and lists of 130 
approved parallel imports available from regulators in the United Kingdom and Denmark. Our 131 
estimates of parallel trade activity are consistent with other studies using different data sets 132 
(Enemark et al. 2006; Kanavos et al. 2004). 133 
 134 
Statistical Analysis 135 
This study examines the total impact on prescription drug pricing across the European 136 
Union that can be plausibly tied to parallel trade. If parallel trade amounted to perfect arbitrage, 137 
price dispersion would vanish in the European Union (or would reflect only transportation costs 138 
and, in this case, licensure or repackaging costs). If parallel trade affected prices in only a subset 139 
of countries, or if parallel trade affected prices only moderately in all countries, price dispersion 140 
would fall in the European Union, as compared to countries outside the European Union where 141 
parallel trade is not legal. Our analysis relies on a comparison of the “treated” countries (i.e., 142 
European Union countries) to “control” countries (i.e., non–European Union countries). 143 
  9 
We calculated descriptive statistics on prescription drug volume and sales from across 144 
our market-basket sample. We do not address within-country price dispersion across packages 145 
(or across payers), because in countries outside of the United States there is typically a single 146 
payer. In all markets, a drug is usually marketed in many presentations (dosage forms and 147 
strengths), few of which may be the same in all countries. Since a cross-national comparison of 148 
packages would include only a subset of the 30 countries, we aggregated to the drug level and 149 
used the quantity-weighted mean price across all presentations of a chemical combination in 150 
subsequent analyses.1 As Danzon and Furukawa (2006) have noted, comparing prices at the drug 151 
level rather than the package level yields more matches across countries (though not without 152 
some tradeoffs in the precision of the comparison). 153 
We measured price differentials as the absolute percent difference between the mean 154 
price across all presentations in each country and the mean price in all countries in the sample, 155 
all European Union countries in the sample, and all non–European Union countries in the sample. 156 
Although parallel trade occurred before 1995, it was after that year that much of the legal 157 
uncertainty concerning intellectual property was resolved and parallel trade became more 158 
widespread. In addition, Spain and Portugal, which tend to have relatively low drug prices, 159 
became legal sources of parallel exports in 1995.2 Since it may take time for parallel traders to 160 
establish operations and apply for licenses, a change in price dispersion may not be immediate 161 
after the change in policy. Therefore, we report the distributions of price differentials for the 162 
periods 1993 through 1994, 1995 through 1999, and 2000 through 2004. 163 
In addition to calculating mean price differentials, we calculated alternative measures of 164 
price dispersion, including the mean maximum price differential across countries, the coefficient 165 
of variation of the price for each drug across countries, and the standard deviation of the price for 166 
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each drug across countries. Each of these measures has been used in other studies of price 167 
dispersion (Kanavos et al. 2004; Carlson and Pescatrice 1980; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; 168 
Sorensen 2000; Goldberg and Verboven 2004). If the law of one price holds, all should be equal 169 
to 0. We used Wilcoxon signed rank tests to compare price dispersion in European Union 170 
countries and non–European Union countries in the three time periods. 171 
Because the results of the descriptive analysis could reflect differences in the products 172 
available across markets or differences in the products available across markets over time (as 173 
new drugs were introduced or were introduced in more countries), we also examined price 174 
dispersion using regression techniques similar to an approach by Goldberg and Verboven (2004). 175 
Specifically, for each country and quarter, we examined the relationship between the absolute 176 
log price difference of each drug and the mean European Union price for that drug while 177 
(1) controlling for country–drug fixed effects and (2) interacting a dummy variable equal to 1 for 178 
European Union countries with dummy variables for each year in the data set. We used the log 179 
price difference because the distribution of price differentials is highly skewed. Although the 180 
errors may be nonnormal, which makes standard t tests suspect, we have a very large sample size, 181 
so the deviation from normality should be inconsequential for hypothesis testing. We repeated 182 
this analysis for the log price difference of minimum prices across all presentations of a drug 183 
within a country, since the lowest-priced products may be targeted at the most price-sensitive 184 
buyers, who may find parallel imports most appealing. We also repeated the analysis after 185 
excluding the United States from the data set, in case the value of the US dollar caused changes 186 
in price dispersion over time. Note that changes in the value of the dollar would affect only the 187 
price differential between the United States and other countries, not the price difference between 188 
other countries using a different currency. 189 
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This “difference-in-differences” approach is one way to identify the effects of parallel 190 
trade. In other words, because prices in countries outside the European Union after 1995 should 191 
not have been affected by parallel trade, this approach allowed us to compare price differences in 192 
European Union and non–European Union countries before and after parallel trade. If non–193 
European Union countries experienced a decline in price dispersion at the same time that 194 
European Union countries were “treated” with the legalization of parallel trade, and if this 195 
change affected only non-European countries, then our difference-in-differences approach would 196 
be invalid. However, reductions in transportation costs, greater price transparency, and other 197 
forces that would be likely to affect price dispersion would affect all countries, not only non–198 
European Union countries. The inclusion of country–drug fixed effects addresses concerns about 199 
changes in the supply of drugs over time that might have driven changes in price dispersion as 200 
we focused on within-country and within-drug changes in price differentials. We also estimated 201 
the same regression using a time trend instead of a dummy variable for the post-1995 period to 202 
capture any gradual changes during this period. 203 
204 
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Results 204 
Table 1 describes the data available for the analysis. We included information on 1,023 205 
prescription drugs in 30 countries. There were 7,133 chemical–dosage form–strength 206 
combinations—a mean of 6.96 presentations per drug available anywhere, but only 2.36 207 
presentations available per country. The mean parallel importer share was 18 percent at the 208 
presentation level and 12 percent at the drug level, because not all presentations of a drug were 209 
subject to parallel trade. Although some countries (notably Sweden, Denmark, and the 210 
Netherlands) experienced a marked increase in the penetration of parallel imports during the 211 
study period, even the threat of parallel trade (in countries that did not show an increase) could 212 
have an effect on prices if manufacturers adjust prices to make arbitrage less attractive. 213 
The Figure shows the mean distribution of mean price differentials for European Union 214 
countries, non–European Union countries, and all countries by time period. The mean price 215 
differential is the percentage difference between the ex-manufacturer price and the mean price 216 
for the same drug across countries. (The patterns were similar when we used wholesale prices 217 
and retail prices instead of ex-manufacturer prices [data not shown].) As shown in the Figure, 218 
there was substantial price dispersion across all countries and within the European Union. There 219 
was a slight reduction over time in the number of extreme price differentials. However, about 220 
half of the price differentials exceeded 50 percent in all three sets of countries in each time 221 
period. Although we had no reason to expect a reduction in price differentials among non–222 
European Union countries, the distributions among the European Union countries did not show a 223 
dramatic change concurrent with the adoption of parallel trade. 224 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the aforementioned group measurements and for 225 
the mean standard deviation and the mean coefficient of variation of prescription drug prices 226 
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across all countries and in the European Union. In each set of countries over time, there was little 227 
change in the magnitude of any of the measures of price dispersion, except for a marked increase 228 
in the standard deviation. In European Union countries, the mean price differentials were 229 
significantly different between the 1995-1999 period and the other time periods, but the 230 
difference between the 1993-1994 and 2000-2004 periods was not statistically significant. The 231 
maximum price differentials for European Union countries in the 2000-2004 period were 232 
statistically different from the earlier periods and, in fact, increased over time. The mean 233 
standard deviation of prices across countries actually increased between the period before 234 
parallel trade and the more recent observations (all countries, 16.1 to 20.6; European Union 235 
countries, 10.8 to 17.3). 236 
Table 2 also shows p values for Wilcoxon tests of price dispersion measures between the 237 
time periods for all three country subsets. Price dispersion was greater outside of the European 238 
Union than within it. Comparisons of dispersion in each of the three time periods between each 239 
country category (data not shown) showed that dispersion was significantly different across 240 
country categories. 241 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis. Each row contains the estimated 242 
coefficient for the dummy variable for each year, with one column for the main effect and 243 
another column for the interaction with the European Union dummy variable. Across all 244 
specifications, the results indicate a reduction of price dispersion after 1995 for all countries 245 
relative to the first year in the data set (1993); all coefficients after 1995 are negative and 246 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, the interaction with the European Union 247 
variable is frequently positive and statistically significant, particularly for the most recent years. 248 
In the post-1995 period, only in 2000 and 2001 did price differentials fall more for European 249 
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Union countries than for other countries. The qualitative results are the same across our choice of 250 
average or minimum price differences and the inclusion or exclusion of the United States from 251 
the data set. 252 
253 
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Discussion 253 
Parallel trade is thought to be one way to reduce cross-market price discrimination by 254 
prescription drug manufacturers (Danzon and Chao 2000; Ridley, Grabowski, and Moe 2006). In 255 
the United States, pressure to permit parallel trade has resulted from growing concerns about 256 
high drug prices and international price disparities. In this study, using data from the European 257 
Union, we found little evidence that parallel trade affected price dispersion of prescription drugs 258 
over a 12-year period. 259 
Specifically, we looked at information on over 1,000 products in 36 categories in 30 260 
countries over a 12-year period to determine whether price dispersion decreased in the European 261 
Union (where parallel trade is permitted, especially after 1995) and non–European Union 262 
countries (where parallel trade is not permitted). In both descriptive analysis and regression 263 
analysis, we found that about half of the price differentials in prescription drugs exceeded 50 264 
percent in all European Union and non–European Union countries in each time period, and that 265 
the distributions of prices among European Union countries did not show a dramatic change 266 
concurrent with the adoption of parallel trade. In regression analysis, we found that although 267 
price differentials decreased after 1995 for most countries, they decreased less in the European 268 
Union than elsewhere. 269 
To be clear, we do not suggest that parallel trade had no effect anywhere, or that parallel 270 
trade does not have the potential to have a significant impact on prescription drug markets. Our 271 
findings imply that the legalization of parallel trade does not necessarily lead to a reduction in 272 
price differences across countries. Some impediments to parallel trade in the European Union 273 
have been examined in greater detail elsewhere (Kyle 2006). 274 
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The lack of a direct effect of parallel trade may be due to the particular regulatory scheme 275 
adopted in the European Union (i.e., individual country licenses at the dose–pack level) and to 276 
responses by manufacturers to continue price discrimination through the use of different 277 
packaging and brand names (Kyle 2006). Important differences between the European Union and 278 
US markets regarding the regulation of parallel trade and other aspects of pharmaceutical 279 
markets make it difficult to predict how parallel trade would fare in the United States. Unlike 280 
national health insurance programs in European countries, many patients in the United States 281 
purchase prescription drugs on a self-pay basis or within tiered copayment structures (Huskamp 282 
et al. 2003; Joyce et al. 2002). Because these patients are more sensitive to drug prices than their 283 
European counterparts, parallel trade may have greater opportunity to impact prices in the United 284 
States. 285 
In addition to the relative insensitivity to prescription drug prices among patients in the 286 
European Union, the profits of pharmacists are regulated in many countries. Although the 287 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom use “clawback” mechanisms, which enable savings from 288 
the use of parallel imports to be shared between pharmacists and the government health authority, 289 
pharmacists in other European Union countries have little incentive to find a low-cost supply. 290 
Another area of uncertainty concerns rationing of supply to low-price countries, a 291 
strategy attempted by firms in Europe and in dealings with Canadian Internet pharmacies that 292 
sell prescription drugs illegally to patients in the United States. Competition laws in the 293 
European Union may limit the ability of firms to ration, because rationing may be interpreted as 294 
an abuse of market power. However, it is unclear how US and Canadian competition laws would 295 
affect rationing. Given the relatively small size of the Canadian prescription drug market 296 
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(roughly one-tenth the size of the US market), it is unlikely that parallel trade from Canada alone 297 
would have a large impact on prices in the United States (Porter 2004). 298 
Our analysis has some limitations. First, we assessed pharmaceutical products in 36 299 
therapeutic categories, but there may be different results in drug categories that we did not 300 
examine. Second, parallel trade may have less effect in the European Union than it would in 301 
higher-price markets like the United States, where pharmacists, insurers, and patients have 302 
greater incentive to switch to less expensive prescription drugs. In any case, it is clear that the 303 
development of a regulatory infrastructure for parallel trade does not automatically reduce 304 
international price dispersion for prescription drugs. 305 
306 
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Endnotes 306 
1. For example, a drug that sold 5 units of a presentation at $5, 10 units of a presentation at $10, 307 
and 10 units of a presentation at $1 would have a quantity-weighted mean price of 308 
(5 / 25) ! 5 + (10 / 25) ! 10 + (10 / 25) ! 1 = $6.00, whereas a drug that sold 5 units of a 309 
presentation at $5, 15 units of a presentation at $10, and 5 units of a presentation at $1 would 310 
have a quantity-weighted mean price of (5 / 25) ! 5 + (15 / 25) ! 10 + (5 / 25) ! 1 = $7.04. 311 
The $7.04 reflects the fact that more relatively expensive units were sold. 312 
2. When Spain and Portugal became member states of the European Union, they were required 313 
to make changes to their patent laws to provide the same level of intellectual property 314 
protection as other member states. Also, a derogation period that prohibited parallel exports 315 
of products that had not received strong patent protection prior to membership was imposed 316 
for both countries, which ended in 1995. 317 
318 
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Table 1. Data Available for the Analysis 
Variable n Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Quarters 47 — — — — 
Countries* 30 — — — — 
Therapeutic classes† 36 — — — — 
Drugs 1,023 — — — — 
Unique presentations‡ 7,133 — — — — 
Observations with parallel trade 16,546 — — — — 
Presentations per drug across all countries 1,023 6.97 14.7 1.0 172.0 
Presentations per drug in each country 1,023 2.36 2.6 1.0 32.0 
Share of parallel imports for a presentation‡ 16,448 0.18 0.2 0 1.0 
Share of parallel imports for a drug§ 8,761 0.12 0.2 0 1.0 
Ex-manufacturer price of presentation|| 518,995 34.33 148.8 6.4 12,775.4 
Standard units of a presentation sold in quarter 519,011 13.85 70.5 1.0 2846.0 
SD indicates standard deviation. 
* The following countries were included in the analysis: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
† See Appendix. 
‡ “Presentation” refers to a drug–dosage form–strength combination. 
§ Conditional on parallel trade taking place. 
|| Values are expressed as 2000 US dollars. Negative prices were excluded from the analysis. All values are reported to two 
significant digits. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Period p-Value* 
  
 
1993-1994 
 
 
1995-1999 
 
 
2000-2004 
1993-1994 
versus 
1995-1999 
1995-1999 
versus 
2000-2004 
1993-1994 
versus 
2000-2004 
All countries       
Maximum price differential, percentage 
of all-countries mean (median) 
221.53 (223.99) 215.92 (214.69) 233.44 (235.86) 0.03 < 0.001 0.03 
Mean price differential, percentage of 
all-countries mean (median) 
50.61 (50.82) 48.70 (48.57) 51.50 (51.53) < 0.001 < 0.001 0.10 
Coefficient of variation† 0.73 0.70 0.75    
Standard deviation‡ 16.12 20.71 29.85    
EU countries       
Maximum price differential, percentage 
of EU mean (median) 
148.32 (221.04) 152.95 (152.82) 162.21 (162.02) 0.28 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Mean price differential, percentage of 
EU mean (median) 
43.56 (43.77) 40.97 (40.58) 42.65 (42.58) < 0.001 0.003 0.24 
Coefficient of variation† 0.60 0.57 0.59    
Standard deviation‡ 10.80 12.80 17.28    
Non–EU countries       
Maximum price differential, percentage 
of non–EU mean (median) 
205.55 (206.60) 187.36 (186.40) 200.73 (200.59) < 0.001 < 0.001 0.53 
Mean price differential, percentage of 
non–EU mean (median) 
51.92 (52.07) 51.98 (51.74) 54.11 (53.95) 0.48 < 0.001 0.005 
Maximum price differential, percentage 
of EU mean (median) 
151.47 (153.66) 161.80 (161.87) 169.98 (169.88) < 0.001 0.002 < 0.001 
Mean price differential, percentage of 
EU mean (median) 
93.37 (91.81) 111.26 (112.69) 101.96 (98.01) 0.36 0.13 0.88 
Coefficient of variation† 0.74 0.73 0.76    
Standard deviation‡ 19.28 27.31 35.86    
EU indicates European Union. 
* p-Values from Wilcoxon tests. 
† Mean of (standard deviation of price / mean of price) within drug name across all countries. 
‡ Mean standard deviation of drug price across all countries. 
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Table 3. Results From Regressions of Log Price Differentials 
Year Quantity-Weighted Average Price, Coefficient (Standard Error) Minimum Price, Coefficient (Standard Error) 
         
  
Non–EU 
Countries 
 
 
EU Countries 
Non–EU 
Countries, 
Excluding US 
 
 
EU Countries 
 
Non–EU 
Countries 
 
 
EU Countries 
Non–EU 
Countries, 
Excluding US 
 
 
EU Countries 
Intercept 0.885 (0.003)† 0.827 (0.003)† 0.923 (0.003)† 0.847 (0.003)† 
1994 0.019 (0.005)† –0.050 (0.007)† 0.024 (0.005)† –0.053 (0.007)† 0.005 (0.006) –0.041 (0.008)† 0.009 (0.006) –0.042 (0.008)† 
1995 –0.210 (0.006)† 0.023 (0.007)† –0.189 (0.006)† 0.011 (0.007) –0.237 (0.007)† 0.023 (0.009)† –0.224 (0.007)† 0.019 (0.009)† 
1996 –0.207 (0.006)† 0.025 (0.007)† –0.192 (0.006)† 0.018 (0.007)† –0.238 (0.007)† 0.033 (0.009)† –0.234 (0.007)† 0.035 (0.009)† 
1997 –0.168 (0.006)† –0.012 (0.007) –0.162 (0.006)† –0.010 (0.007) –0.201 (0.007)† 0.012 (0.009) –0.207 (0.007)† 0.025 (0.009)† 
1998 –0.193 (0.006)† 0.029 (0.007)† –0.191 (0.006)† 0.035 (0.007)† –0.226 (0.007)† 0.044 (0.008)† –0.237 (0.007)† 0.061 (0.009)† 
1999 –0.148 (0.006)† –0.001 (0.007) –0.150 (0.006)† 0.009 (0.007) –0.161 (0.007)† –0.004 (0.008) –0.174 (0.007)† 0.016 (0.009) 
2000 –0.069 (0.006)† –0.065 (0.007)† –0.079 (0.006)† –0.046 (0.007)† –0.071 (0.007)† –0.082 (0.008)† –0.088 (0.007)† –0.058 (0.008)† 
2001 –0.075 (0.006)† –0.047 (0.007)† –0.083 (0.006)† –0.029 (0.007)† –0.072 (0.007)† –0.065 (0.008)† –0.091 (0.007)† –0.038 (0.008)† 
2002 –0.130 (0.006)† 0.013 (0.007) –0.139 (0.006)† 0.032 (0.007)† –0.118 (0.007)† –0.015 (0.008) –0.136 (0.007)† 0.011 (0.008) 
2003 –0.161 (0.006)† 0.052 (0.007)† –0.159 (0.006)† 0.059 (0.007)† –0.144 (0.007)† 0.019 (0.009)† –0.153 (0.007)† 0.036 (0.009)† 
2004 –0.172 (0.006)† 0.069 (0.008)† –0.159 (0.006)† 0.068 (0.008)† –0.144 (0.007)† 0.024 (0.009)† –0.143 (0.007)† 0.033 (0.009)† 
F 301.87 268.77 264.01 244.94 
R2 0.0348 0.0323 0.0306 0.0295 
n 189,919 182,802 189,919 182,802 
EU indicates European Union. 
* The unit of observation in the regressions is drug–country–quarter. The dependent variable is the log price difference between the ex-manufacturer price for a 
drug in a country and the mean price for that drug in the European Union. Regressions included country–drug fixed effects and were estimated using the 
XTREG procedure in Stata (StataCorp LP, College Station, Tex.). 
† Coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix. Therapeutic Classifications Included in the Analysis* 
Category Code Therapeutic Classification 
Alimentary tract and metabolism A4A1 Serotonin antagonists antiemetics/antinauseants 
 A4A9 Other antiemetics and antinauseants 
Blood and blood forming organs B1C1 Cyclo-oxygenase inhibitor platelet aggregation inhibitors 
 B1C2 ADP (adenosine diphosphate) receptor antagonist platelet 
aggregation inhibitors 
 B1C3 GP IIb/IIIa (glycoprotein) antagonist platelet aggregation 
inhibitors 
 B1C4 Platelet cAMP enhancing platelet aggregation inhibitors 
 B1C5 Platelet aggregation inhibitors, combinations 
 B1C9 Other platelet aggregation inhibitors 
 B1D Fibrinolytics 
Cardiovascular system C3A1 Potassium-sparing agents plain 
 C3A2 Loop diuretics plain 
 C3A3 Thiazides and analogues plain 
 C3A4 Potassium-sparing agents with loop diuretic combinations 
 C3A5 Potassium-sparing agents with thiazides and/or analogue 
combinations 
 C3A6 Other diuretics 
 C7A Beta-blocking agents, plain 
 C7B1 Combinations with anti-hypertensives and/or diuretics 
 C7B2 Combinations with other drugs of group C 
 C7B3 Combinations with all other drugs except those of group C 
 C8A Calcium antagonists, plain 
 C9A ACE inhibitors, plain 
 C9B1 ACE inhibitor combinations with antihypertensives (C2) 
and/or diuretics (C3) 
 C9B2 ACE inhibitor/beta-blocker combinations 
 C9C Angiotensin-II antagonists, plain 
 C9D Angiotensin-II antagonists, combinations 
Anti-infectives for systemic use J1D2 Injectable cephalosporins 
Antineoplastic and 
immunomodulating agents 
L1A Alkylating agents 
 L1B Antimetabolites 
 L1C Vinca alkaloids and other plant products 
 L1D Antineoplastic antibiotics 
 L1X1 Adjuvant preparations for cancer therapy 
 L1X2 Platinum compounds 
 L1X3 Antineoplastic monoclonal antibodies 
 L1X9 All other antineoplastics 
 L3A1 Colony-stimulating factors 
 L3A9 All other immunostimulating agents excluding interferons 
* From the Anatomical Classification of Pharmaceutical Products developed and maintained by the 
European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association, as provided in the IMS Midas database. 
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Figure Legend 
Distributions of prescription drug price differentials by time period in European Union countries, 
non–European Union countries, and all countries. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
